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Reasoning and Moderation as Principles 
of International Humanitarian Law 
(Part 1)
Thinking of war we can have in 
mind very different ideas. Starting 
from brutal revenge, desire of pos-
session, through religious reasons, 
economic interests, private animos-
ity up to a  theory of just war and 
philosophical/ethical issues that 
I call tools of war. One may of course 
indicate a lot of them, starting from 
justice, that has became a frame for 
just war theory, but even this one de-
mands a kind of measure, enable to limit the war as such. Looking for 
such a measurement we can indicate at least two ideas necessary to tame 
the war. Those are reasoning and moderation. Looking for their roots 
I chose two disciplines/fields appropriate to consider their meaning. 
Question about the reasoning and moderation should be asked by ethics, 
or better to say applied ethics of different professions (initially involving 
soldiers, war correspondents, and auxiliary personnel, and now extended 
to scientists, researchers, and politicians). The second realm, in which we 
ask about reasoning and moderation, is law, with particular subject to 
international humanitarian law and its applications to individual cases. 
Both fields are crucial for the understanding war and for shaping its 
fate. Focusing on modern international humanitarian law, understood 
as the one that grew on the philosophical theory of just war, one should 
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examine its beginnings, to see the role of reasoning and moderation. 
If indeed (and probably no one doubts) “none of the moral excellences 
arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit 
contrary to its nature”1 and “excellence, then, is a state concerned with 
choice, lying in mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and 
in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it,”2 
golden mean would be the main principle of both law and applied ethics.
Would it be easier to apply the golden mean to particular practical/
applied ethics than to international law? Not necessary, especially if we 
are willing to agree that such a law might be the extension ethical beliefs 
and that a) it grew on the understanding of particular virtues and values, 
b) was based on so called “requirements of humanity,” c) was established 
as a result of reasonable analysis of previous wars, enormous and unex-
pected cruelty of one human against another, one state against another. 
Here we cannot forget that “justice is not included in the definition of war, 
because the very point to be decided is, whether any war is just, and what 
war may be so called.”3 But what if the division line is not that clear? If it’s 
hard to find moderation and the codes of ethics and law have to adapt to 
the new challenges and requirements arising from practice? What if this 
“practice” is not only new but also scary and therefore difficult to grasp? 
If a world as we know it suddenly falls and there is a need to redefine it?
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the war and its techniques 
have undergone a profound transformation. “Never before has the num-
ber of civilians in towns and villages become the target – with the de-
liberate choice – of murderous mass destruction measures” – about the 
devastation caused by using the new assortment of arms of the Great War 
wrote Jerzy Pomianowski.4 At the same time “all these old -fashioned vir-
 1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. W. D. Ross, in: The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Bar-
nes, vol. 2, Princeton 1995, p. 1742.
 2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., p. 1748.
 3 Grotius, The Right of War and Peace, transl. A. C. Campbell A. M., New York–London 1901, 
p. 18.
 4 J. Pomianowski, Wstęp [Introduction], in: I. Babel, Dziennik 1920 [Diary 1920], transl. J. Po-
mianowski, Warszawa 1998, p. 18 (transl. M. M. B.).
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tues – wrote Stefan Hertmans – fallen in the hell of the trenches of World 
War I […] Cruelty and mass slaughter definitely changed the morality, 
vision of life, mentality and habits of this generation. From the battlefields 
of fragrant like pastures trample under foot, from soldiers that were sa-
luting even in the moment of death, from the eighteenth -century paint-
ing idyllic military scenes, filled with hills and groups of trees, emerged 
strangled by mustard gas mental disorder, fields full detached limbs, full 
of old -fashioned type of human, which has been literally torn apart.”5 
Progress in this field was soon made by the Second World War and lat-
er by subsequent conflicts in which policy was becoming increasingly 
prominent. But in order not to fight savagely, already in the nineteenth 
century the international community began to work on the principles, 
rules and laws of war. To find a kind of reasoning and moderation in 
using weapon and proper measures international community agreed to 
begin the process of creation of the international humanitarian law. In 
its assumptions, it was not as restrictive as the Kantian idea of eternal/
perpetual peace, but in its foundations we can find echoes of this theory.6
Therefore, international community, arising only when states form-
ing the international system have common interests and common values 
and believe that they are bound by a set of common principles, partici-
pate in the work of common institutions, and belong to one culture or 
civilization,7 recognizing the common purpose had to take appropriate 
actions. Aware not only of human nature but also focused on the develop-
ment or war technique, taught by the experience of numerous conflicts, 
community started to work on international law, that could help find 
moderation and, in this way, protect civilization from the cruelty of war. 
Already in the nineteenth century, it was found that the killing became 
too cruel and resulted not only from direct combat between opponents. 
 5 S. Hertmans, Wojna i terpentyna [War and Turpentine/org. Oorlog en terpentijn], transl. 
A. Oczko, Warszawa 2015, p. 332 (transl. M. M. B.).
 6 Vide I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/in-
trel/kant/kant1.htm (2.02.2017).
 7 Vide S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Worlds Order, New 
York 2011.
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The states began to come up with some legal tools to protect themselves 
in the first place from the effects of the weapons that reach not only the 
enemy but also destroy the less accurately traced targets, and also the 
weapons that harm the adversary and extinguish unnecessary suffering.
One of the first of this type of acts is the St. Petersburg Declaration 
of 1868. This act applies to the resignation of the use in war of missiles 
containing less than 400 grams of explosive substance (so -called small-
-caliber bullets).8 Countries signing the Declaration were therefore aim-
ing to investigate the expediency of banning certain missiles “in wars 
between civilized nations,” all technical restrictions being “caused by the 
requirements of humanity.” Thus, beyond the practical dimension, there 
is an ethical dimension in the law, reminding of the value and dignity 
of human life. Bearing in mind the historical experience of the peoples, 
it was also emphasized that “the progress of civilization should have the 
effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war.”9 The spirit 
of reasoning and looking for a proper measure, understood in the spirit 
of the golden mean seemed to be present even in this early acts and con-
siderations. In line with these ideas, the aim of the war was not to bring 
the other country into a fall, not to deprive it of its future/culture and not 
to massacre all of its citizens, but to weaken the armed forces so that the 
aggressive nation that began its military operations could not wage war. 
The restrictions imposed by the Declaration made it possible to believe 
that, in order to achieve that goal, the fighters would not use weapons 
that unnecessarily aggravate human suffering or “make inevitable death,” 
which in turn meant violating fundamental human rights.
States that has signed the Declaration went further. They not only 
agreed not to use in the war the missiles mentioned above and invited 
other nations to sign the document but left the right to the next agree-
ments and exacerbations of the already existing regulations, bearing in 
mind the improvements that science can make in the field of armaments. 
 8 St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, https://ihl -databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xs
p?action=openDocument&documentId=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C (1.20.2017).
 9 St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, op. cit.
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It was difficult not to assume that an increasingly evolving technique 
would not leave the war on its own, and that countries would not choose 
to exploit new discoveries to create ever more sophisticated and danger-
ous weapons. Future war – as expected even in the nineteenth century – 
should be able to reconcile their basic needs with human rights. And 
while we know that history has written in this regard quite different sce-
narios, further legislation specifying the types and rules for using specific 
weapons has become a reality.
Talks about arms reduction and the need for peaceful coexistence have 
flared up again when, in 1898, Tsar Nicholas II, inspired by Russian con-
sciousness, delayed the issue of military ministers of war, foreign affairs 
and finance, proposed holding a conference on arms confinement. „Car 
with an olive branch,” said Vienna, “is something new in history.”10 After 
months of negotiations, the conference venue chosen Hague. During the 
First Hague Conference debates were held on three commissions: arma-
ments, rules of war and arbitration, and at the second conference (1907) 
a commission on maritime law was added. There were elaborated solu-
tions concerning, inter alia, the civilian rights of defense, the treatment 
of prisoners and spies, the prohibition to the use of poisons and deceit, 
the ban on bombing of open cities, the rules for using the white flag, or 
conditions of occupation of hostile territory.11 The result of the first con-
ference were three conventions, while the second – held in 1907 – have 
developed thirteen conventions.
When analyzing solutions to reduce arms, it is worth noting that suc-
cessive solutions came relatively soon after the Petersburg Declaration. 
Thus, the use of splintering and gas bullets (The Hague 1899), balloon 
shunting and explosives (The Hague 1907), the use of poisonous gas, 
poisonous and bacteriological agents (Geneva 1925) were soon banned. 
And while they worked in the spirit of rational thought, trying to im-
pose moderation on warfare and the beginning of the arms race, often, 
 10 B. W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914, New 
York 1966, p. 298.
 11 B. W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower…, op. cit., p. 298.
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however, the law did not affect the actual operation of the armed forces. 
“Grenades, dense gas and tank flotillas – trampling, fatigue, death”12 – 
wrote about the atrocities of the Great War, Erich Maria Remarque. When 
soldiers fell in the trenches one after the other, when they were hurting, 
“suffering excessively” or “dying not necessarily,” they were lying in war-
time hospitals, they did not remember, or perhaps they simply did not 
know anything about the existing, established laws. Did anyone seek ra-
tional justification? Their right and duty was to fight, and it was the fight 
that made them cruel at the cruelty. Unintentionally often, senselessly, 
and finally and unlawfully. Only the order of conscience, thought some-
times forced for too long moment free from killing, let to see a man in 
the fallen enemy. However, in order to see the humanity of the defeated 
enemy, it took a moment to think, and there was simply no time for it on 
the fronts of the Great War. At that time, war was “an endless monotony 
of misery, diversified by terrible tragedies, not silver -shining bayonets, 
or trumpets in the morning sun.”13 And yet, this awareness opened up 
the moderation and rational application of the law. Further wars brought 
new challenges and international law was not always able to keep pace 
with the technical development and the cruel “fantasy” of the armed 
states. Bearing in mind the war practice, but also looking forward to 
the future, the next acts and conventions concern, inter alia: the pro-
hibition of research, production and stockpiling of biological and toxic 
weapons (London, Moscow, Washington 1972), prohibition of conven-
tional weapons causing excessive suffering or irreversible effects (Geneva 
1980), prohibition or restriction of the use of mine -traps (Geneva 1996) 
and later also anti -personnel mines (Oslo 1997). But in addition to the 
technical / hardware development of war, other challenges have not es-
caped, pointing to the need for greater legal and ethical legitimization 
 12 E. M. Remarque, Na zachodzie bez zmian [All Quiet on the Western Front], transl. S. Napierski, 
Stalinogród (Katowice) 1956, p. 97 (transl. M. M. B.).
 13 H. Barbusse, Ogień [The Fire], transl. Zofia Jaremko -Pytowska, Warszawa 1959, p. 371 (transl. 
M. M. B.).
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of the issue of conducting warfare and dealing with enemies, allies, and 
the civilian population.
The first document, which in the international scale, in a very pre-
cise way regulates the laws and customs of land warfare, is the Hague 
Convention (Hague IV) on Laws and Customs of War on Land from 
1907.14 It clearly defines, above all, who is to be considered a combatant, 
thus settling the question of the civilian population. When there is no 
doubt about the combatant, we will recognize a professional soldier or 
of a compulsory or voluntary (because it was still) abduction, the main 
problem occurred in the case of people not belonging to the army. While 
under the Hague IV, a soldier has the duty to stand out with a uniform 
or a badge, may bear arms and must obey war customs, there are doubts 
about the distinction between civilians and so -called common troops 
and unmarried volunteer troops. Thus, according to the Hague IV, these 
same formations, as well as the soldiers who join the army, have identi-
cal responsibilities and rights. Moreover, according to Article 2 of the 
Annex to the Convention “the inhabitants of a territory which has not 
been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take 
up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to orga-
nize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as bel-
ligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and cus-
toms of war.”15Thus, the armed conflict -making community voluntarily 
renounces the protection and rights of the civilian population, thereby 
passing under military jurisdiction.
However, it must not be forgotten that the armed forces are not the 
only ones who decide to take direct action. In addition to the army we 
have and non -combatant war workers, subjected to identical require-
ments and laws as soldiers. The latter group includes journalists, war 
correspondents, doctors, clergy, all kinds of military service providers, 
and wounded who are no longer capable of active combat as a result of 
 14 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 18.10.1907, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/hague04.asp (1.23.2017).
 15 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), op. cit.
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the fight. And although the responsibilities and activities undertaken by 
representatives of both groups is fundamentally different, in every posi-
tion, they have the same rights. A good example, strongly emphasized 
by international law, is the situation of prisoners of war (both fighters 
and non -combatants). The first legal requirement – the ethical duty of 
the captives – is to provide humanitarian treatment. Here the signato-
ries of Hague IV and the Annex indicate the possibility of human rights 
abuses. So when internment turns out to be necessary, prisoners must 
be treated with the right dignity and their rights, whether property or 
religion, cannot be violated in any way. The law also allows prisoners to 
work (paid), provided that it is not used for war purposes and even re-
leased under the word of honor. Patients and injured were also particu-
larly protected.16 But apart from securing the rights and quite precisely 
distinguishing the civilians from the fighters, the Annex carries the en-
tire catalog of obstructions that the war is protected. Once again, they 
are anchored in human rights, which is becoming the main focus of the 
legislative act. It is forbidden to kill or wound another in a treacherous 
manner, in an unfair fight, or in the way of deception, and even more so 
when he surrenders and as “voluntarily powerless” he will wait for the 
victorious grace. It also prohibits psychological violence and the belief 
that the legal conditions of war are of minor importance. It is forbidden 
to „declare that no quarter will be given.”17 The most important units, as 
before the others, however, appear to be that “family honour and rights, 
the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions 
and practice, must be respected.”18
Exhaustion not only ceases to be an unwritten law that has been used 
by the cruel invaders for centuries, but is legally forbidden. And while 
the Great War, and later the Polish -Bolshevik war, that were described 
by Isaac Babel, had nothing to do with legal restrictions, that legal and 
 16 The Annex refers here to The Geneva Convention of 1906. Further records and details will be 
found in The Geneva Convention of 1949, which, given the tremendous experience of World War 
II, precisely defines these issues.
 17 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV, Annex), op. cit., Art. 23.
 18 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV, Annex), op. cit., Art. 46.
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ethical prohibition extends beyond the end of the biological survival 
of man or the preservation of his species. What is more important, the 
signatories of the Annex noticed not only the value of a single life, but 
also the threat that war has for the whole civilization heritage. Hence, in 
Article 27, it is mentioned about its protection and non -targeting of at-
tacks in places not related to war activities, such as “buildings dedicated 
to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hos-
pitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected.”19However, 
their protection – as demonstrated by successive wars – is inadequate. 
Both the man and the products of his culture became the object of great 
helplessness and thoughtlessness, and later of a very concrete, planned, 
even methodical destruction and extermination. It seems therefore that 
the creators of the pre -war legal acts did not fit in the head of the war 
thrust, covering first the Old Continent, later practically the whole world. 
In the wildest imaginations, the civilized nations could not have made the 
technique and science of humanity the ultimate threat. Commitment to 
reason and the need for moderation were found only in the framework 
of the reflection that came after the next war.
In the light of World War II it was necessary to redefine previously 
known concepts, to clarify laws (not invalidating earlier international ar-
rangements, but rather extending them to new war experience). Here are 
all conventions, contracts and rights have been broken. Nazi Germany, 
militarized Japan, and the Soviet Russians did not respect the right of 
liberty, property, freedom of religion, did not appreciate human life, and 
the obligation to act in moderation was alien to them. Faced with the 
unimaginable cruelty, technical improvement of the army, and finally 
the denial of human dignity and the planned elimination of entire na-
tions, it was necessary to revise the applicable laws. In keeping with the 
spirit of previous conventions, they were rewritten almost anew, add-
ing the experience of the recent hekatombs. In 1948, the international 
community adopted in Paris the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1949 brought more Geneva conventions: The Third Geneva Convention 
 19 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV, Annex), op. cit., Art. 27.
200 Magdalena M. Baran
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and The Fourth Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Five years later, the nations added to the catalog of their rights signed 
in The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict.
Bearing in mind that “disregard and contempt for human rights have 
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of man-
kind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy free-
dom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.”20 The in-
ternational community has opted for the specific renewal and refine-
ment of human rights already described in The Charter of the United 
Nations.21 This is how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came 
into being. Until 1966, it was only a UN resolution, but since its adop-
tion it has traditionally been recognized as a law. Respecting its rights, 
already inherently human, was a prerequisite for a postwar world in which 
people would coexist peacefully. Without them it would be impossible 
to develop friendly relations between nations, and above all to restore 
faith in man, in his dignity, worth, freedom and rights. To inalienable 
human rights, in addition to already mentioned, included, among others: 
the right to life, liberty and security, to freedom of expression, religion, 
conscience and opinions, the right to work, to adequate standard of liv-
ing, to learn and to participate in culture. The international community 
has agreed that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,”22 “without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”23 and 
equal in using reason and using ethical sense. No one can be detained 
 20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, http://www.un.org/en/universal -declaration-
-human -rights/index.html (23.01.2017).
 21 Charter of The United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/charter -united -nations/(23.01.2017).
 22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit., Art. 1.
 23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, op. cit., Art. 2.
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without trial, tortured or humiliated. No one can interfere in the private 
life of the individual. The above -mentioned laws will be binding for sub-
sequent postwar documents that will refer to the principles, rights and 
freedoms „defined” by the Declarations. It is the dignity and the broadly 
understood humanitarian treatment that turn out to be key concepts for 
both the already mentioned Geneva Conventions. The first of the 1949, 
the so -called. The Third Geneva Convention (August 12, 1949), defines the 
ways in which prisoners of war are treated. In many points it details The 
Annex to The Hague Convention of 1907, directly defining the behavior 
that should occur in specific cases.
Bearing in mind the experiences of the Second World War, in the be-
ginning articles The Third Geneva Convention emphasizes the way people 
should refer to non -combatants, including humanitarian duty, regardless 
of race, religion, gender, possessions etc., which excludes discrimina-
tion and segregation. The Convention presupposes their broad protec-
tion by not allowing to host them, nor does it allow any assassination 
on their lives, inviolability or personal dignity.24 Recalling earlier defini-
tions of combatants and civilians, the Convention emphasizes that pris-
oners of war can only become members of the armed forces (and there-
fore soldiers, members of the militia, volunteer units and resistance), 
accompanying persons (as defined in the Annex to Hague Convention) 
and “Inhabitants of a non -occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provid-
ed they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”25 
Importantly, a prisoner cannot be physically maimed or subjected to 
medical and scientific experience, which was commonly practiced in 
German labor camps during World War II. The international community, 
aware of these events, forbade – at every stage of the captivity, from the 
 24 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12.08.1949, Art. 3, 
https://ihl -databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12
563CD002D6B3E&action=openDocument (24.01.2017).
 25 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, op. cit., Art. 4.
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moment of arrest, through interrogation and imprisonment or prison 
camp – of any physical or psychological violence against prisoners, par-
ticularly torture, mutilation or any kind of coercion.
A man who has fallen into captivity, the Convention does not deprive 
any of the rights that he owes thanks to his humanity. Although he loses 
his personal freedom and remains imprisoned, he does not lose his dig-
nity, the right to own property, profess his religion and practice, nor to 
intellectual, cultural, educational or sporting activities. The prisoner also 
has the right to communicate with the outside world and thus to receive 
free correspondence and to receive mailings. The Convention strictly sets 
out the conditions of imprisonment itself, including issues related to the 
accommodation and boarding of prisoners. Housing warming, mois-
ture protection, lighting, rations of food, water and tobacco, the need to 
provide clothing and footwear suitable for the climate, and adequate hy-
giene and medical care – all is legally sanctioned. The work of captives, 
a thorny issue and so important for legal regulation after World War II 
is allowed by the Convention, but must be carried out in a timely man-
ner and in a manner similar to the conditions of doing the same work 
in peace. Under Art. 78 prisoners have the right to complain both on 
the terms of imprisonment and on the work. It is not, however, that the 
prisoners are not under any obligation. The Convention obliges them to 
adhere to the camp regulations, as well as punish them (through fines, 
revocation of privileges, forced labor, detention).26
Similar prohibitions, however, relating to methods of treating civilians 
during the war, introduced the Fourth Geneva Convention.27 In relation 
to civilians, it prohibits attacks on life, torture, mutilation, assault on per-
sonal dignity, hostage taking, and the use of any kind of cruelty (physical 
and mental). Bearing in mind the experience of the Second World War, 
the Convention stresses the need for respect for religious practices, the 
 26 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, op. cit., Art. 89.
 27 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12.08.1949, 
https://ihl -databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C125
63CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument (24.01.2017).
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dignity of the person, honor, family rights, and customs, and the spe-
cial protection against rape, intimidation, insults and “public curiosity” 
that jeopardize one’s privacy. The document also raises the issue already 
mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely the 
prohibition of segregation or discrimination resulting from any reason.28 
Civilians, and therefore persons who do not participate in military activi-
ties in any way and do military work, are also to be protected from the 
effects of war, and in special cases (for sick, injured, cripples, old people, 
children up to fifteen, pregnant women and mothers of children up to 
the age of seven), special zones or sanitation zones should be designated 
to facilitate their protection.29
However, in spite of this law, military practice often goes against civil-
ians and non -combatants. Although civilians have always suffered dur-
ing the war, never before has mass killing been the target of war. Today, 
however, it is the civilians who are the first target of the attack. “Civilians 
are being killed to get them out like in Bosnia, to simply kill them like in 
Rwanda or for one reason or another, as is happening in Chechnya. Or 
they kill civilians when they are not able to kill the soldiers, and yet one 
have to kill to put the war machine in motion”30 wrote war correspon-
dent Jean Hatzfeld. How, if not purpose and precision, explain the situa-
tion in which a flier shoots a raft full of civilians crossing a river? How to 
explain the labor camps and the selection of those who survived longer 
than others? How to understand the activities of totalitarian regimes that 
do not respect the rights of their citizens and condemn them to humili-
ation, suffering and death? Ethics, understood even as a technical team 
of the notion of good and evil, have nothing to say. What about the law, 
reason or moderation? What happens to humanity that not only does 
not apply, but does not even seek the golden measure?
 28 Vide Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 27 and 
Art. 34.
 29 Vide Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 14.
 30 J. Hatzfeld, Linia zanurzenia [Line of Immertion], przekł. J. Giszczak, Warszawa 2009, p. 114 
(transl. M. M. B.).
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Such violations of the rules of both Geneva Conventions, understood 
as acts detrimental to persons or property protected by it – and therefore 
“willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological ex-
periments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or 
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile 
Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and 
regular trial prescribed in this Convention”31 and in the case of civil-
ians also “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of 
a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces 
of a hostile Power […], taking of hostages and extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly”32 are not only forbidden but also punishable 
by criminal sanctions. The document imposes on the Contracting Parties 
not only the obligation to issue national provisions on such sanctions and 
orders for the search and even prosecution of persons violating the provi-
sions of the Convention, but also to prosecute them irrespective of their 
nationality. Thus, war crimes were recognized as transnational crimes 
under the jurisdiction of international tribunals (such as the International 
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court). These, in turn, are 
based on their own general statutes, as well as documents prepared for 
the legal development of particular cases of war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and crimes of aggression.33 Also, the Conventions them-
 31 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, op. cit., Art. 130.
 32 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, op. cit., Art. 147.
 33 Apart from the Statute of the International Court of Justice and The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, we have a number of documents / statutes defining criminal pro-
ceedings in cases of individual wars and armed conflicts on an international, interstate and local lev-
el. Separate documents define: issues of prosecution and punishment of war criminals (Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8.08.1945), prevention of genocide (Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) New York, 9.12.1948), non -use of lim-
itation of war crimes (Convention on the Non ­Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, New York, 26.11.1968), and criminal prosecution in cases such as 
the war in the Balkans and Genocide in Rwanda (Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia, New York, 25.05.1993, and Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, New 
York, 8.11.1994).
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selves contain records that they are not the only documents defining war 
laws. Apart from international documents, they allow the emergence of 
additional interstate special agreements, which deal with specific issues 
or conflicts, but their provisions cannot be less favorable to prisoners 
and civilians than those contained in the Conventions. The rights and 
obligations enshrined in the Geneva Conventions are therefore superior 
to any later war law and must be rooted in them.
It is worth noting that while preparing the basis for the international 
control of the armed forces, the two Conventions, one by one, account 
for the “sins” and negligence that the Second World War committed to 
both prisoners and civilians. Adopting these documents means not only 
making efforts but making specific decisions to prevent the repetition of 
similar actions in future armed conflicts. That is why the documents point 
such detailed guidelines, prescribing almost every predictable aspect of 
the war fate of civilians and captives, trying to ensure the best protection 
of their rights. For this reason, the very volume of each of these docu-
ments is about ten times greater than the Annex to The Hague Convention 
of 1907, which did not know such terms as a labor camp, compulsory 
export or ghetto, nor assumed the possibility of genocide understood as 
planned extermination conducted methodically, in a manner condemned 
by cruelty, hatred and thoughtlessness.
When we consider the intervention, the commitment is not in an ag-
gressive war that comes to our country, but in a war that seems to pose no 
direct threat to us, moderation is necessary. But how to apply the principle 
of moderation and act in the spirit of reason, when against the aggressive 
regime, lacking internal legitimacy that harms its own citizens, thereby 
violating all applicable laws, has already used any “pre -war” means? How 
to find golden mean in war time? I will address this issue in the second 
part of this article.
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Abstract
Reasoning and Moderation as Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law (Part 1)
Thinking of war means facing ideas and theories much different than those known 
and good established in everyday life. Even well known concept demands redefinitions. 
Among ideas understood as intellectual tools of war one can indicate two crucial, ac-
companying each consideration about war as such. Those are moderation and reasoning. 
Both should be present in out thinking about war, no matter if we would analyze political, 
legal, ethical or humanitarian dimensions of war or – in the other hand – no matter if we 
would consider its meaning for whole community or life/fate of individual human being. 
The first part of this article focuses on theoretical considerations, while further analyzes 
will indicate the consequences that thinking in the spirit of moderation and reasoning 
has in theory and practice of international humanitarian law.
Keywords
humanitarian law, moderation, reasoning, war, values
Abstrakt
Rozsądek i umiar jako podstawy międzynarodowego prawa 
humanitarnego
Myślenie o wojnie oznacza stawianie czoła ideom i  teoriom znacznie odmien-
nym od tych, które napotykamy w codziennym życiu. Nawet dobrze znane kon-
cepcje wymagają redefinicji. Pośród idei, które możemy uznać za intelektualne 
narzędzia wojny, należy wskazać dwie zasadnicze, towarzyszące każdemu roz-
ważaniu o wojnie jako takiej. Są to umiar i  rozsądek. Obie powinny być obecne 
w  myśleniu o  wojnie, niezależnie od tego, czy analizie poddawany jest jej poli-
tyczny, prawny, etyczny czy ludzki wymiar; i z drugiej strony niezależnie od tego, 
czy rozważamy jej znaczenie dla całej wspólnoty czy dla życia/losu jednost-
ki. Przedłożona tu pierwsza część artykułu skupia się na teoretycznych rozważa-
niach, podczas gdy dalsze analizy będą wskazywały na konsekwencje, jakie myśle-
nie w duchu umiaru i rozsądku wnosi do prawa dotyczącego konfliktów zbrojnych.
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Słowa klucze
prawo konfliktów zbrojnych, rozsądek, umiar, wartości, wojna
